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OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plain til f -Respondent,

vs.

Case No.

9619
EDGAR GLEN. CUDE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant has appealed from his conviction of
grand larceny upon jury trial in the Second Judicial District, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The appellant, Edgar Glen Cude, was convicted of
grand larceny by stealing his own automobile from the
possession of the labor lienholder. Upon a finding of guilty
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by the jury, the appellant was committed to the Utah State
Prison for the indeterminate period provided by law.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State of Utah contends the conviction should be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellant, Edgar Glen Cude, brought his car to
Mr. Harold H. Pettigrew, operator of Harold's Auto Sales
in Ogden, Utah on August 16, 1961 (R. 7-8). The vehicle
would not run and had to be towed to Mr. Pettigrew's shop
(R. 8). Upon examination of the vehicle by Mr. Pettigrew
and Mr. Eugene Seifert, Mr. Cude was informed that the
vehicle would require substantial repairs, including replacement of the camshaft and bearings (R. 95). He was further told that he could not be given an exact appraisal of
the cost of repairs since the amount of repair work necessary could not be ascertained until the vehicle's engine was
torn down and examined (R. 9). Mr. Cude informed Mr.
Pettigrew that he was going to be out of the State, in Montana, for about 30 days and that Mr. Pettigrew should do
whatever was necessary to put the car in good condition so
that he would have good transportation (R. 10). Mr. Pettigrew informed Mr. Cude that from his initial appraisal the
cost might be around $180.00, but that he could not tell
what it would be until the engine was torn down (R. 9-10).
Mr. Cude told Mr. Pettigrew to do whatever was necessary.
Thereafter, Mr. Pettigrew repaired the vehicle, including
doing several things which appeared necessary after ex-
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aming the engine ( R. 1) . The cost of the repairs was
$345.97. On September 20, 1961, Mr. Cude returned to
Ogden and was presented with the bill for repairs to his
vehicle (R. 14). He made no objection to the bill (R. 70).
He had only a few dollars on his person, and indicated that
he would go to Salt Lake City to get the money from a
friend to pay for the repairs to the car (R. 67, 70, 71, 78,
80). Thereafter, Mr. Cude left. At 9 :00 p.m. that night,
he had not returned and his car was locked up at Mr. Pettigrew's place of business (R. 4).
Subsequently, the night of the 20th, or the morning of
the 21st of September, 1961, Mr. Cude returned to Mr.
Pettigrew's business establishment and took his vehicle
(R. 62-64). He testified that he took his car for the purpose of selling it to see if he could get some money to ap.ply on the bill (R. 66-71). Cude at no time testified that
he intended to return the vehicle, but rather testified that
he intended to sell it, and intended to pay Mr. Pettigrew
as he could. On September 23, 1961, Mr. Denny Maxwell
was stopped,. driving the vehicle, and at that time he indicated he had purchased the vehicle for $50.00 from Mr.
Cude. He produced the registration which had not been
negotiated. Mr. Cude admitted selling the vehicle to Mr.
Maxwell (R. 32-38). No monies were ever paid to Mr.
Pettigrew in satisfaction of the labor lien or debt.
During the trial, defense counsel on direct examination asked Mr. Cude if he had ever been convicted of a
felony, to which he replied affirmatively (R. 61). He was
not asked the number of convictions or the nature of the
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crimes (R. 61-62). The defense counsel also questioned
(R. 61):
"Q. When was the last time you were under a
felony conviction? Either serving time, or-

" A.

1952."

On cross-examination (R. 75), the prosecutor asked:
"Q. Isn't it a fact that you have been convicted of a felony?

"A.

I admitted that.

"Q.

How many times, Mr. Cude?

"MR. RAAT: Object, Your Honor. This is incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial to this case.
"THE COURT: Oh, I'll hear the answer. You
opened it up.
"MR. NEWEY:
"A.

Three times.

"Q.

Three times?

"A.

Yes sir.

Q.

How many felonies?

"Q. Tell us what the nature of the first felony
was, Mr. Cude.

"MR. RAAT: I object, Your Honor. This is
incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial.
"THE COURT: You opened it up, Mr. Raat.
He may answer. The objection is overruled.
MR. NEWEY: Q.
Mr. Cude?

What was the first felony,
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"A.

A statutory offense.

"Q.

What was that?

"A.

Statutory. You heard me.

"Q.

Statutory rape?

"A.

Yes.

"Q.

What was the next felony you were con-

victed of?
"A.

Armed robbery.

"Q. And what was the next felony you were
convicted of, Mr. Cude?

"A.

Armed robbery.

"Q. Now, if I understood your testimony
right, you say that you have been out since 1952?

"A. I said that was the last time I was convicted of a felony.
"Q.

tentiary?

"A.

When did you last get out of the peni·

In 1960."

The appellant took exceptions to certain instructions
given to the jury by the trial judge (R. 118, 119). Based
on the above record, the jury returned a finding of guilty.
The appellant contends that his conviction was based on
error, and now seeks reversal.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE ACCUSED, BY THE PROSECUTOR, AS TO PREVIOUS FELONY CONVICTIONS, THEIR NATURE AND NUMBER WAS PROPER CROSSEXAMINATION.
The appellant contends that the trial judge "abused
his discretion" in allowing the prosecutor to cross-examine
appellant relative to the number and nature of his previous
felony convictions. The appellant relies upon a statement
extracted from State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.
2d 229 (1936), loc. cit. p. 371. The appellant has taken
his quote from the ninth principle set out in that opinion1•
The quotation is actually inappropos for the cited proposition. What the court was actually speaking about was
the liability of a defendant to be cross-examined on his
criminal "acts" not amounting to a conviction, but which
would relate to his veracity. This is obvious from the
court's reference to rule (7), which covers that subject,
and, further, it is obvious from the fact that rule (1) was
not mentioned, which rule states :
" ( 1) Any witness may be asked on cross-examination whether he has been convicted of a felony."

It is doubtful, therefore, whether the H ougensen case
is authority for the principle urged. However, even if it
lThe court set out some eleven rules fo·r the guidance of the bar in crossexamining or presenting evidence on character.
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is concluded that the case is proper authority in this instance, it is misapplied under the facts of this case. First,
the principle urged would require a finding of abuse of
discretion. It appears from the language of the Hougensen
case that the court was attempting to allow the trial court,
which has an opportunity to see and observe both the witnesses and jury, broad discretion, since the court stated:
"But we think the matter should be left to the
sound discretion of the court * * * "
In the instant case, defense counseP himself opened
the matter for inquiry, and very obviously sought to limit
implications to be drawn from the evidence to a conviction
of one unnamed felony and, further, that since 1952 the
accused was able to completely rehabilitate himself. This
implication was false; and if for no other reason than to
correct the erroneous inference that the appellant had not
been in prison since 1952, the prosecutor was properly allowed his examination. It goes without saying that the
nature of the crime committed is of great importance in
weighing the defendant's veracity and, consequently, inquiry into the nature of the crime or crimes committed
should be allowed. McCormick, Evidence (1954), p. 90, 92.
By the same token, where the defendant has been convicted
of more than one felony, the effect of this "trait of character" is relevant to the weight to be accorded his testimony. It may be that in a particular instance the parading
2 The

fact that a defense counsel may put on evidence adverse to his case
does not necessarily preclude a prosecutor from thereafter doing so, especially for clarification. State V. Seyboldt, 65 U. 204, 236 P. 225
(1925); Wall, Judicial Admissions: Their Use in Criminal Trials, 53
Jnl. of Crim. Law, Criminology and Police Science 15 (1962).
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of a whole raft of previous convictions may become cumulative and the relation to veracity be _outweighed by the
inference of general criminality; but such could not be
claimed in this instance, since the prosecutor did not dwell
at any great length on the accused's convictions, and merely
set the record straight, rebutting the obviously distorted
picture that was left by the defense counsel. The trial
judge himself noted the fact that defense counsel had
opened the door, and in the exercise of sound discretion
allowed the prosecutor fair latitude.
Secondly, it is submitted that the appellant's contention is contrary to accepted principles of cross-examination.
The general rules in this area are noted in 3 Wharton's
Criminal Evidence, p. 370:
"Since, however, the weight of the evidence as
a factor of impeachment depends upon the character of the crime involved in the previous conviction
-that is, whether it involved moral turpitude or
was merely malum prohibitum-it is held that the
nature of the crime may be shown."
Further, op. cit. p. 384:
"The prosecution may show all convictions of
the defendant, and may prove both the number and
places of former convictions and the nature of the
crimes involved therein."
A similar conclusion is noted in 98 C. J. S., Witnesses, Sec.

507c, p.411:
"It is generally held that inquiry is not confined
to the mere fact of conviction of some crime, but
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the name and nature of the crime of which the witness was convicted may be brought out, * * *
and

"Number of convictions. It may be shown that
the witness has been convicted of crime several
times."
See also 58 Am. Jur., Witnesses, Sec. 750; McCormick, Evidence, p. 89-92; Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. III, Sec. 980, 98587.

In State v. Crawford, 60 U. 6, 206 P. 717 ( 1922), a
similar issue was raised before this court. The court found
that cross-examination of an accused into the nature of a
felony conviction was permissible. The court noted :
"The defendant testified on his own behalf,
and, in response to an interrogatory by his counsel,
answered that he had been convicted of a felony.
On cross-examination by the district attorney, defendant was asked what was the charge on which
he had been convicted. To this question his counsel
objected, on the ground of irrelevancy and immateriality. Defendant answered that the conviction
was for robbery. It is argued that the statute of
Utah requires that 'a witness must answer the fact
as to a conviction for felony,' and that, when that
question has been answered, the demands of the
statute have been met. State v. Gottfreedson, 24
Wash, 398, 64 Pac. 523, and State v. Strodemier, 40
Wash, 608, 82 Pac. 915. The weight of authority,
and, we think, the better reasoning, is that the
jurors are entitled to know of what particular felony a witness has been convicted. The evidence of
conviction is admissible for the purpose of affecting the credibility of the witness. Some crimes involve a greater degree of moral turpitude than
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others. Some felonies are more heinous than others.
Some convictions on felony charges affect the cred·
ibflity of witnesses much more than others."
In addition, the court approved cross-examination by
the district attorney into another felony conviction of the
defendant not admitted on direct examination, and where
the appeal from the conviction was not final. The instant
case gives little room for distinction. In State v. Owen, 73
Ida. 394, 253 P. 2d 203 (1953), the Idaho Supreme Court
was faced with a similar contention as that now made by
the appellant. The accused on direct examination testified
that he had been convicted of a felony. On cross-examination, the prosecutor brought out the fact that there had
been three felony convictions and also established their
nature. The court cited the Crawford case, supra, with
approval and concluded:
"We conclude that no error was committed by
requiring the appellants to state the nature of the
felonies for which previous convictions had been admitted."
The same conclusion was recently affirmed in State

v. Roderick, ______ Ida. ______ , 375 P. 2d 1005 (1962), where
the prosecutor asked of the accused the number of felonies
for which he had been convicted.
Other cases from this court and other courts support
the prosecutor's action. State v. Johnson, 76 U. 84, 287 P.
9.09; State v.- Wood, 2 U. 2d 34, 268 P. 2d 998 (1954); State
v. Goodloe, 144 Ore. 193, 24 P. 2d 28; Dively v. People,
74 Colo. 268, 220 P. 991; State v. Sorrell, 85 Ariz. 173, 333
P. 2d 1081; People v. Guiterrez, 152 Cal. 2d 115, 312 P. 2d
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291. It is submitted that the appellant's contention is without merit.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
WITH RESPECT TO INSTRUCTING THE
JURY.
The appellant in two points in his brief has claimed
three instructional errors of the court. The State will meet
these claims in one point of argument.
The appellant's first claim of error relates to the trial
court giving the following instruction :
"Before you can find the Defendant guilty of
the offense of grand larceny, as charged in the information, the State must prove to your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following:

*

*

*

*

"That the taking away of said automobile was
done with the wilful, unlawful and felonious intent
of depriving the said Harold's Auto Sales ·of its
right, as a lienholder, to the possession of said automobile."
The appellant contends that the court should have added
the word "permanently" before the word "depriving."
It is submitted that the appellant can claim no basis
for reversal on this point for two reasons. First, it is submitted that use of the word "permanently" would require
the jury to find a deprivation of something greater than
the right the lienholder had, and consequently, could only
confuse the jury. In order to put the matter clearly before
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this court, it is essential to determine what rights the lienholder had. It is submitted that he has two independent
rights. First, he has the right to receive payment for his
labor, and, secondly, he had the right to maintain possession of the property he labored on in security for payment
of his bill. These rights are separate and distinct, but related to the extent that payment ends the possessory right.
Section 38-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953. However, loss
of the possessory right does not excuse payment. By the
same reasoning, if the possessory right is interfered with
or destroyed, payment coming some· time in the future cannot change the fact that the lienholder lost an otherwise
valuable right to possess the enliened property as security
or foreclose his lien if necessary. With these distinctions
in mind, the problem involved becomes clear. The possessory right is not a right to permanent possession of the
liened property, but rather the right is a temporary one,
conditioned upon payment. Under the provisions of Section 38-2-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, the lienholder only
has a right to retain the property for the period until the
labor debt is satisfied. As a consequence, an instruction
which would require the jury to find a permanent interference with possession is misleading since the right of
possession is conditional and temporary. There is a distinction between the conditional right of the lienholder and
the fee right of the owner. Each is different and as a consequence makes a difference in the intent required in larceny of such interests. Perkins, Criminal Law, (1958) p.
224, notes the distinction and states :
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"The common statement is that the intent to
steal-or animus furandi, to use the Latin substitute-requires an intent to deprive the owner permanently of his property. This conveys the idea in
a general way but requires some explanation. Mention has been made of the possibility of larceny committed by the owner himself, by taking possession
from another for the purpose of defeating a property right of the possessor. Hence it must be understood that an intent to deprive a possessor of the
benefit of a property right he has by reason of his
possession may be sufficient for the intent to steal."
The real problem is obviously what is the requisite mens
rea. The answer is: to destroy the lienholder's possessory
right to the property for the period for which he is entitled
to possession. State v. Parker, 104 U. 23, 137 P. 2d 626
( 1943) . When this principle is compared to the instruction
given by the court, it appears that the jury was sufficiently
appraised of the requisite intent. The requested instruction of the appellant would have been misleading and confusing, which rendered the instruction improper. State v.
Hougensen, supra. The court possibly might have been
more precise in the instructions given by stating that the
jury must find that the appellant intended to deprive the
owner of his possessory interest as security for payment
for as long as the lienholder was entitled to such security,
but it is doubtful if this would be any-the-more comprehensible to the jury than the instruction given. However,
one thing is certain, that the requested instruction was not
sufficiently definite as to require the court to present it
to the jury, and no error could be claimed from the failure
to do so.
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Additionally, it is submitted that another substantial
reason exists why no error can be claimed by appellant.
It is simply that there was no evidence before the jury
that would warrant their finding an intention to return
the res. Appellant's testimony, and judicial admission, was
that he took the automobile to sell it to satisfy the debt.
Thus, he never intended to allow the lienholder to regain
his possessory interest, and can claim no error from a
failure of the trial court to be more definitive in this area.
The error of the appellant's defense was to conclude that
the intent to pay could absolve him from the interference
with the possessory security interest. As seen above, the
possessory interest is a right in addition to the right to
request payment, although allied thereto. Since no evidence
was before the jury as to an intended limited deprivation
of the possessory interest, and since the judicial admissions
of the appellant show an intent to sell, thus depriving the
lienholder of his possessory interest3 the jury could have
found no other way than against the appellant. The
appellant, therefore, could not conceivably claim any
prejudice. Since Section 77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated
1953, requires this court to weigh for specific substantial
prejudice, no basis for reversal can be claimed in its absence. In State v. Anderson, 100 U. 468, 116 P. 2d 398
(1941), this court noted:

"* * * The instructions objectionable as
they are nevertheless covered the issues and the evidence. Under the evidence the jury were justified
in finding the verdict of guilty. The objectionable
3The question of whether after sale the lien would continue as against a
third person purchaser is not before the co:urt.
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instructions given or those requested and refused
could not as we view the matter have changed the
result."
The recited principle is equally applicable to the instant
case, since, in view of the appellant's judicial admissions,
no other instruction could have changed the result and consequently no prejudice can be claimed 4 •
Appellant' second contention is that the court erred
by instructing the jury that certain facts had been established ( R. 112) . This the court did not do. It instructed
the jury that they had to find certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt or else acquit. All the court did was to instruct the jury with reference to the evidence before them.
It merely tailored the instructions to meet the evidence.
This is a far cry from instructing a jury that certain facts
are "established beyond controversy," which was the complaint made in State v. Green, 78 U. 580, 6 P. 2d 177
(1931). In many cases, this court has directed that the
court tailor its instructions for the jury, based on the evidence before them. Thus, in State v. Aures, 102 U. 113,
127 P. 2d 872 (1942), the court approved of instructions
that were stated to the specific facts and testimony of the
case, similar to those given in this case. Thus, the court
noted:
"Instruction No. 7 was properly given, as such
instruction went to testimony given at trial."
State submits that since the definition of larceny under the Utah stat~
ute contains no reference to "permanency", such is not a part of Utah law
so long as the taking is otherwise "felonious." This is obvious, since the
only degrees of larceny are grand and petty, and no reference is made to a
temporary taking-wrongful appropriation. However, since the matter
need not be decided, the issue may be reserved until neces6ary fu.r decision.

4 The
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In State v. BeBee, 110 U. 484, 175 P. 2d 478 (1946),
this court stated:

"* * * we emphasize that the court should
apply the law to the facts of the case as they appear
in the evidence * * * "
In the BeBee case, the court called attention to the decision
of State v. Thompson, 110 U. 131, 170 P. 2d 153 (1946),
wherein the court directed trial judges to do what was done
in the instant case. The court said :
"Defendant urges that the court erred in giving
general abstract instructions, using ancient and
highly technical legal terms not understood by laymen, giving instructions which had no application
to the facts in this case, and in not applying the
law to the facts which were supported by the evidence, and that the jury was probably misled thereby and the case should be reversed on that account.
We have repeatedly criticized the giving of abstract
statements of the law to the jury, and held that it
is the duty of the court to apply the law to the
facts supported by the evidence and to not instruct
on any question which is not involved in the case
under the evidence. * * * (Cases cited.) We
think that it cannot be too strongly emphasized that
the court should apply the law to the facts as they
appear from the evidence, and should instruct only
on the law which has a bearing on facts, and in
stating the necessary elements to constitute the
crime charged it should submit to the jury the facts
involved in the case and not merely generalizations,
and where possible should avoid the use of technical
legal terms and cumbersome definitions thereof, by
using terms which will readily be understood by
laymen. In that way, the jury will be given a much
clearer understanding of its problems."
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A similar conclusion has been reached by the Washington Supreme Court, State v. Phillips, 42 Wash. 2d 137, 253
P. 2d 919. Abbott Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec.
668, states:
"The charge and instructions, whether given
by the court of its own motion or upon request,
should be so framed as to conform to the facts in
evidence."
No error can be claimed from the court's instructions based
on the evidence and testimony received at trial where the
jury was still allowed to find as it pleased.
Finally, the appellant contends that it was error not
to give the following instruction (R. 19) :
"In theft by larceny, the felonious intent that
I have mentioned must exist when possession of the
property is originally obtained by the person not
entitled thereto, and it is not larceny to take property of another through mistake or under an honestly entertained claim of ownership or right to
possession.''
The trial court apparently refused the instruction on
the grounds that its substantive content was otherwise adequately "covered" by other instructions. The appellant apparently contends that the court's failure to so instruct
ignored an issue or an affirmative defense. In both respects, the contention is erroneous. The court instructed
the jury as follows (R. 112) :
"Before you can find the Defendant guilty of
the offense of grand larceny, * * * the State
must prove to your satisfaction,
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"* * * That the taking away of said automobile was done with the wilful, unlawful and felonious intent of depriving the said Harold's Auto
Sales of its right as a lienholder to the possession
of said automobile."
The court further instructed the jury that (R. 112) :
"'Felonious' means proceeding from an evil
heart or purpose, done with a deliberate purpose to
commit a crime. A malicious wrongful act."
The jury was, consequently, fully instructed on the
intent that the accused had to possess in order to be convicted of the crime. It is generally recognized that the
court need not give a requested instruction· in the language
of its proponent. Thus, Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice,
4th Ed., Sec. 663, notes the rule:
"So, too, as a general rule, the court is not
obliged to give requested instructions in the language precisely as framed and submitted, however
correct they may be; but he may, in lieu thereof,
give instructions prepared by himself, covering, as
he views the case, all the questions of law presented
upon which it is necessary and advisable to instruct
the jury, * * * "
In State v. Chadwick, 7 U. 134, 25 P. 737 (1891), the
Territorial Supreme Court recognized the above rule. In
that case, the trial court instructed the jury as to what it
would affirmatively have to find to convict the defendant
of larceny. The defendant had proposed another instruction on the same aspect of the case. The court found no
error in refusing the instruction, stating:
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"While the above instruction was not given in
the language of the learned counsel presenting
them, yet it embodies the substance of the request,
and leaves the question to the jury as a circumstance for them to consider, and to say whether,
under all the facts and circumstances shown, possession of stolen property was evidence of guilt or
not; and at the same time the court instructed the
jury that possession alone is not sufficient evidence
upon which to convict. These instructions were
given with reference to the proofs before them at
the time, which the jury must have understood and
applied with reference to such facts of possession
as were shown; and, while the instruction was not
as full and explicit as it might have been, yet it
sufficiently covered the question presented." (7
Utah at 140.)
In State v. Campbell, 116 U. 74, 208 P. 2d 530 (1949),
the court again recognized the rule, noting :
"The court did not give the instruction desired
by the defense in the form so requested; but he did
define the greater and the lesser offense each in
detail, and pointed out that the latter was included
in the former. He then instructed the jury to consider, first, the greater offense and its elements;
and if the State failed to prove any one or more of
the elements of that offense .beyond a reasonable
doubt, then the jury should consider the lesser
offense. The Court followed this with an instruction that if the State failed to prove any one or
more of the elements of this offense, then they
should acquit defendant. Although not stated in
its exact words, the jury could not apply the instructions given without applying the requirements
of Section 105-32-5, quoted." (116 Utah at 82.)
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In the instant case, the requested instruction of the
appellant went to the theory of claim of right. However,
neither mistake nor claim of right are affirmative defenses,
but are matters that go to the question of whether the defendant had the required mens rea. State v. Parker, supra.
This is not a situation where an affirmative defense such
as self-defense, necessity, or insanity are involved. The
taking under a claim of right or belief of legality only negatives the "felonious intent" required as an element of
larceny. A clear statement of the defense is contained in
"The Claim of Right as a Defense to Theft Cases," 4 Utah
L.Rev.528, (1954):
"The elements of intent is a material consideration in all areas of the criminal law. In the field
of theft offenses, the claim of right is of considerable importance in determining the existence of the
required criminal intent.

*

*

*

"* * * With these factors in mind, the
courts have held that if the taking is open and
avowed and under a good faith claim of title, the
intent necessary to justify a theft conviction is lacking." (Emphasis added.)
Williams, Criminal Law, 2nd Ed., Gen. Part, p. 322
(1961), notes:
"Claim of right in larceny, as elsewhere, covers
not only mistake of law but mistake of fact, but
with the latter the present discussion is not primarily concerned. Either kind of mistake shows that
the taking was without the requisite intent." (Emphasis added.)
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Keeping this concept in mind, it becomes clear that
the only difference between the instruction given by the
court and that requested by the appellant was that the
former instructed the jury, affirmatively, as to what it
must find to convict, and the latter would instruct, negatively, as to what would diminish the required intent. It
is clear then that the instructions given by the court adequately covered the issue, and the jury could not have followed the instructions as given and convicted if it found,
as the appellant asserted, that he took his automobile under
a mistaken claim of right.
Additionally, it is submitted that the requested instruction was misleading and for such reason the court
properly refused to give it. As was noted above, the concept of claim of right is not an affir1native defense, but
negatives intent. Th_e instruction proposed by the appellant
is couched in language as though a claim of right were an
absolute defense. The proposed instruction did not appraise the jury that they should consider the nature and
circumstances of the claim in determining whether the appellant had the required intent. R. v. Boden, 174 E. R.
863 (1844); Dominion v. Shymkowich, S. C. R. 606, Sup.
Ct. of Canada (1954). Consequently, no claim of error can
be justified.
Finally, it is submitted that reversal for instructional
error would only be warranted if the instructions, when
taken as a whole, failed to adequately appraise the jury.
Abbott, Criminal Trial Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 669. The
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instructions, when viewed as a whole clearly show that the
jury was fairly appraised as to the issues of the case.
CONCLUSION
The legal issues raised on appeal show that no basis
for a claim of error which would warrant this court in
reversing has been made out. Appellant's extraneous references to a police decision that this case was civil in nature are more than offset by the surreptitious and felonious
actions of appellant, the jury's verdict, and the judge's
sentence. This court has no other reasonable alternative
but to affirm the conviction.
Respectfully submitted,
A. PRATT KESLER,
Attorney General,
RONALD N. BOYCE,
Deputy Attorney General,

Attorneys for Respondent.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

